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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON

COPY NO. 1

May 24, 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NSC PLANNING BOARD

SUBJECT: Draft Record of Actions -- 445th NSC Meeting

Enclosed herewith is a draft Record of Actions taken at today's Council meeting.

We would appreciate it if you could check this draft with each of your principals and advise us by the close of business on Thursday, May 26, whether it is acceptable.

JAMES S. LAY, JR.
Executive Secretary



When detached from the enclosure this
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DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS
445th NSC Meeting
(5/24/60)

The President presided at this meeting. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Director and Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, participated in the Council actions below. The Acting Director, U. S. Information Agency, attended the meeting.

1. ANNIVERSARY OF THE DEATH OF JOHN FOSTER DULLES

Noted that the President was writing a letter to Mrs. John Foster Dulles today, telling her that all members of the National Security Council were remembering the former Secretary of State on this first anniversary of his death, and his great service to this Council.

2. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U. S. SECURITY

Noted and discussed an oral briefing by the Director of Central Intelligence on the subject, with specific reference to an analysis of Sino-Soviet Bloc positions since the Paris heads-of-government meeting; and developments in Turkey and Laos.

3. STATEMENTS REGARDING THE U-2 INCIDENT AND THE RECENT MILITARY TEST ALERT
(NSC Action No. 2231)

Noted, after discussion of the subject, the following instructions by the President regarding statements by Executive Branch officials in public or in Congressional testimony:

- a. Discussion of the U-2 incident could include information which the USSR is presumed to know, but should not include any information which would jeopardize any other intelligence sources

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Authority MR 80-78 #1
By bc NLE Date 4/24/86

PORTIONS EXEMPTED

E.O. 12356, SEC. 1.3 (a)(4)

- 1 - NSC 6822, 1/31/66

NLE DATE 4/8/86

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and methods. Statements should be calm and clear, but not expansive as to details or other intelligence activities. It should be emphasized that the policy of the United States is to seek a just and lasting peace, but to pursue that objective from a position of strength which requires intelligence activities to guard against surprise attack. Therefore, there should be no apologies for our effort to protect the Free World from surprise attack, ^{and} but we should not imply that any other nations were involved in this U-2 activity. While making clear that the basic decision regarding the U-2 program was made by the President, the impression should not be given that the President approved specific flights, their precise missions or their timing.

- b. As to the test alert, it should be made clear that this was of limited scope designed primarily to test long-range communications and command procedures, and that such alerts are necessary to maintain the operational readiness of U. S. armed forces. Authorization was given for more frequent test alerts.

4. POLICY ISSUES IN THE POST-SUMMIT ENVIRONMENT

- a. Discussed the subject on the basis of an oral statement by the Secretary of State as to the position which the United States should take on various policy issues.
- b. Noted the President's approval of the following U. S. positions in the post-Summit environment:
- (1) The President went to the Summit meeting in an effort to achieve some improvement in the international situation.

Despite the break-up of the Summit meeting by Khrushchev, the international situation should be considered by and large to remain essentially as it was before the Paris meeting.

- (2) U. S. allies should be advised that the initiative for further high-level meetings to improve the international situation must come from the Soviets, since Khrushchev scuttled the Summit meeting and efforts by our allies in this regard would be interpreted as a sign of weakness.
- (3) In general, the United States should continue its policy regarding the East-West exchange program, including agreed exchanges of high-level officials. Any change in that program should be the result of Soviet initiative, thereby placing the onus for change on the Soviets. In the event of such change, consideration of the exchange of high-level officials should be on a case-by-case basis.
- (4) The United States should maintain its current position on the reduction and control of armaments, and should be prepared to continue participation in the Geneva negotiations on that subject. If the negotiations should prove futile, it should be clearly the responsibility of the Soviets for causing this result.
- (5) The United States should continue to seek completion of the Geneva negotiations on nuclear testing, but should make clear that these negotiations and the U. S. moratorium on

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nuclear testing cannot go on indefinitely without decision. The United States should ^{seek to} eventually place a time limit on these negotiations.

- (6) The United States should continue its studies and preparations for possible contingencies relating to Berlin, since Khrushchev, despite his recent speech disavowing action on Berlin for six or eight months, may still make some unexpected move, possibly an effort to put pressure on the Berlin economy. It was noted that the State-Defense-JCS-CIA planning group, under the chairmanship of Under Secretary of State Merchant, was engaged in a restudy of Berlin contingency planning, including the possibility of economic pressures *on Berlin.*
- (7) The United States should be on the alert for the possibility of aggressive Sino-Soviet Bloc activity in the Far East, especially by the Chinese Communists.
- (8) The military program as currently approved by the President continues to provide for an adequate defense posture in the post-Summit environment. However, certain operational steps to improve the state of readiness of U. S. forces ~~might be considered~~, ^{but} should be undertaken quietly without unnecessary publicity.

*in the ordinary
course, but
any changes
needed necessary*

5. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA

(NSC Action No. 2166-b-(1); NSC 5902/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2177, 2191, 2195, 2201, 2206, 2213, 2217 and 2228)

Noted and discussed recent developments with regard to the situation in Cuba, in the light of an oral summary thereof by the Secretary of State.

